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Abstract 
We suggest a general logical formalism for Logic Programming based on a four-valued in- 
ference. We show that it forms a proper setting for representing logic programs with negation 
as failure of a most general kind and for describing logics and semantics that characterize their 
behavior. In this way we also extend the connection between Logic and Logic Programming 
beyond positive programs. In addition, the suggested formalism will allow us to see a reason- 
ing about logic programs as a most simple kind of nonmonotonic reasoning in general. © 1998 
Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved. 
I~2,ywordv." Foundations of logic programming: Negation as failure; Semantics for logic 
programs: Nonmonotonic reasoning 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Logic in logic programming 
Logic Programming was initially based on an idea that the language of classical 
logic can be used directly as a programming language, preserving at the same time 
the declarative meaning of  the logical connectives. Accordingly,  the rules of  positive 
(Horn) programs can also be seen as ordinary logical formulas with the usual inter- 
pretat ion of  the connectives involved. However,  with the introduct ion of normal  
programs containing a so-called negation as failure in the bodies of  their clauses, this 
dual ity between declarative (logical) and procedural  interpretat ion has been lost, 
since normal  program rules cannot already be interpreted as classical ogical formu- 
las. Though less immediate, an extension of  the not ion of  a program to so-called dis- 
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junctive programs [27], and especially introduction of normal logic programs with a 
second, 'classical' negation [21,1] had the same effect of weakening the connection 
between Logic Programming and (classical) Logic. 
The absence of a clear and uniform logical basis behind logic programs with ne- 
gation as failure has resulted in an unbridled proliferation of semantics uggested for 
such programs. In part, this was due to the fact that there was no clear ground for 
evaluating such semantics, apart from their computational virtues and coincidence 
with 'respectable' semantics in special cases. In this situation, even the existence of 
a semantics for all programs of a certain kind often has become a decisive reason 
for preferring it to semantics that lacked this feature. 
In recent years, however, an important work has been done, mainly by Jfirgen Dix 
and his colleagues, in developing some general criteria for evaluating and classifying 
existing semantics for logic programs see [13,16,18]; cf. also [35]. In addition, a 
number of approaches have appeared that partly overcome the above problem by 
grounding a reasoning about logic programs and (some of) their semantics on var- 
ious logical formalisms, be it three-valued logic [30], intuitionistic logic [29], a general 
theory of argumentation [19], or a modal logic [32]. 
In this study we will show that there exists a logical interpretation of program 
clauses of a most general kind that agrees with the majority of their procedural in- 
terpretations. In our framework, such program clauses will be considered as genuine 
logical formulas. 
We are going to show that a logic appropriate for logic programs involving nega- 
tion as failure can be based on the sole semantic principle that truth and falsity are 
mutually independent otions. According to this principle, propositions can be not 
only true or false, but also undetermined (neither true nor false) or contradictory 
(both true and false). This will quickly lead us to a four-valued semantics in which 
the four truth-values are identified with the subsets of the set {true,false). This un- 
derstanding of the four truth-values was suggested by Belnap in [3] and has been 
widely used since then, mainly in order to give representation f reasoning and logic 
programming in presence of both incomplete and inconsistent information (see, e.g. 
[4,20,33,37], to mention only a few). What we are going to show here is that it can 
also serve as a logical basis of logic programming in general. 
We will introduce a logical formalism, called biconsequence r lations, that will give 
a syntactic representation for a four-valued inference based on Belnap's interpretat- 
ion of the truth-values. Program clauses will be directly identified with the rules of 
this formalism, and the formalism itself will be considered as a formalization of 
the logic corresponding to logic programs. In this way we will restore the lost con- 
nection between Logic and Logic Programming. In the second part of this study 
[9], we will show that the formalism allows us to give uniform representation f var- 
ious semantics for disjunctive logic programs involving negation as failure, suggested 
in the literature. 
1.2. Logic programming and nonmonotonic reasoning 
The formalism of biconsequence r lations will also bring us another important 
benefit, namely a clear separation between logical and nonmonotonic aspects of rea- 
soning about logic programs. A most surprising eneral conclusion of this study, ob- 
tained on the basis of this separation, is that the distinction between various 
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semantics for logic programs can be largely attributed to the difference in underlying 
(monotonic) logical systems. Moreover, most of these semantics use the same non- 
monotonic principle of 'jumping to conclusions', and the only difference between 
them is reducible to that of the language used for deriving logical sequences. 
The connection between logic programming and nonmonotonic reasoning is wide- 
ly acknowledged these days. This connection is established mainly in the lk~rm of 
translation of logic programs into different nonmonotonic formalisms, such as de- 
fault logic, circumscription or modal nonmonotonic logics. Investigations into the 
nature of this connection have turned out to be mutually profitable. For example, 
many of the declarative semantics uggested for logic programs have been extended 
to other nonmonotonic formalisms (see, e.g. [2,24,28]). 
From the viewpoint of our framework, the connection between these two fields 
turns out to be even closer. In our approach, the reasoning about logic programs 
and their semantics constitutes a (most simple) kind of nonmonotonic reasoning 
in general. Thus, we show in [5] that there is a uniform way of extending the basic 
formalism described below to a general formalism of nonmonotonic reasoning that 
subsumes, among others, default logic and various modal nonmonotonic logics. 
2. Biconsequence r lations and four-valued inference 
In this section we will describe the basic logical formulation used for representing 
and reasoning about logic programs. Most of the results in this and the next two sec- 
tions (together with their proofs) can be found in [7,8]. 
As we said, a logical formalism we suggest for representing logic programs will be 
based on a four-valued entailment. More exactly, we are primarily interested in a 
four-wflued inference based on a particular interpretation of the four truth-values 
suggested by Belnap in [3]. It amounts to their identification with the subsets of 
the set of classical truth-values {t,f}. According to this interpretation, the four 
truth-values T, t, f, 2_ are identified, respectively, with {t. f}. {t}, {./} and ~. Accord- 
ingly, T means that a proposition is both true and l:alse (i.e., contradictory), t means 
that it is 'classically' true (that is, true without being false), f means that it is classi- 
cally false (without being true), while L means that it is neither true nor false (unde- 
termined). 
The above interpretation allows us to see any 4-assignment as a pair of ordinary 
classical valuations, corresponding, respectively, to assignments of truth and falsity 
to propositions. To be more exact, for any 4-assignment v (under the above interpr- 
etation) and any proposition A we can define the lk)llowing two valuations aying, 
respeclively, "A is true in v" and "A is false in v'" 
v ~ A iff t C v(A) 
Clearly, the source 4-assignment can be restored from the above two valuations as 
follows: 
v (A)=V iff v ~ A and v~A 
v~ (A) t iff v ~ A and v ~ A 
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v (A) - - f  iff v#A and v~A 
v(A)=2_ iff v~A and v ~ A 
The equivalence of these two representations shows that the "binary" representa- 
tion is fairly general and does not restrict he set of possible four-valued interpretat- 
ions. However, this representation has a significant heuristic power. In fact, it 
provides a natural connection, noticed already by Belnap, between four-valued rea- 
soning and 'real' problems of commonsense r asoning and thereby the main reason 
for using a four-valued formalism in studying it. 
2.1. Biconsequence r lations 
Taking into account he representation f the four truth-values given earlier, a 
four-valued reasoning in general can be seen as reasoning about truth and falsity 
of propositions, the only distinction from classical reasoning being that the assign- 
ments of truth and falsity are independent of each other. This leads to the following 
construction that provides a syntactic ounterpart of four-valued reasoning. 
In what follows we will reserve the letters a, b, c . . . .  as denoting finite sets of 
propositions, while u, v . . . .  will denote arbitrary sets of propositions. 
By a bisequent we will mean a rule of the form 
a: h i ?c :  d 
The intended interpretation of such rules will be 
" I f  all propositions from a are true and all propositions from b are false, then ei- 
ther one of the propositions from c is true or one of the propositions from d is false". 
In accordance with this interpretation, propositions from a and b will be called, 
respectively, positive and negative premises, while those from c and d - positive 
and negati~,e conclusions. As can be anticipated, bisequents will represent in what fol- 
lows logic programming rules of a most general kind that can include disjunctive 
conclusions and default negation ot only in bodies, but also in heads of the rules. 
The following definition provides a primary characterization f bisequents in ac- 
cordance with their intended interpretation. 
Definition 2.1. A biconsequence r lation is a set of bisequents that is closed with 
respect o the following rules: 
(Monotonicity) 
a: b lkc :  d 
a' : b' I k cf:d' 
(Positive Reflexivity) A : Ik A : 
(Negative Reflexivity) : A IF- : A 
(Positive Cut) 
(Negative Cut) 
i faC_a': bC_b', cCc ' ,  dC_d'. 
a: b l?A.  c: d A, a: b ikc :  d 
a: b l ?c :  d 
a: b lkc :  A, d a: A, b lkc :  d 
a: bl~-c: d 
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|t is easy to check that the above rules agree with their informal interpretation, 
given above. Actually, it is easy to see that a biconsequence r lation is simply a "dou- 
bled" version of an ordinary sequent calculus. This doubling reflects the fact that 
truth and falsity assignments are independent of each other. 
The above definition is easily extendable to arbitrary, possibly infinite sets of 
propositions by accepting the following compactness requirement 
(Compactness) u: vi i -w: z i f fa :  b ike :  d. 
for some finite setsa, b,c, d such that a C_ u, bC_ v, cC_ w and etCz.  
In what follows we will denote by ~ the complement of a set ~. The definition be- 
low describes the 'canonical models' of biconsequence r lations. These objects play 
the same role as deductively closed sets (theories) for ordinary consequence r lations. 
Definition 2.2. A pair of sets of propositions (u, v) is a himodel of a biconsequence 
relation IF if 
u: vUr):  ~. 
If (u, v) is a bimodel, then u will be called its positive part, while v the negatirepart. 
It is easy to show that the above condition is equivalent to the following requirement 
i ra :  b l ?c :  d and aCu,  bCc .  then either c~u¢(3  or d~i i¢ (3 .  
The requirement makes explicit in what sense bimodels can be considered as sets 
of propositions that are closed with respect o the bisequents of a biconsequence r - 
lation. 
The following Representation Theorem shows that biconsequence r lations are 
uniquely determined by their bimodels. 
Representation Theorem. IJ IF is a biconsequence relation, then a:  b IF c :d  i{/. 
[or any bimodel (u,v), i f  a C_ u and b C_ L,, then either c N u 7 k (3 or d cl c ¢ ~1. 
Notice now that any bimodel (u, v) can be identified with a four-valued interpr- 
etation by taking its positive part zt to be the set of true propositions and its negative 
part, v, the set of propositions that are not false. This correspondence allows us to 
show that biconsequence r lations are adequate for their intended interpretation, 
namely that they provide an adequate formalization of four-valued inference (see 
[7] for details). 
Notice that any set of bimodels M generates a biconsequence r lation IF-~ defined 
as follows: 
a:  blF-mc: d iff, for anybimodel (u v) cM.  if aC_u and bC r. 
lhen either c c-1 u #; (3 or d N t; ¢; tO. 
Then the above theorem immediately implies that any biconsequence r lation is 
determined in this sense by some set of bimodels. 
2.2. Biconsequenee r lations and logic programs 
In our approach, bisequents will serve as direct representations of logic program- 
ming rules of a most general kind, namely those involving disjunction and negation 
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in their heads (see, e.g. [23] for a use of rules with not in heads). To be more exact, a 
rule 
notD1 V- . .Vnot  Dk V C 1 V'"VC I ~-A~ A. . .AmAnotB~ A. . .  Anot Bn 
will be represented by a bisequent 
A1,...,Am : BI, . . . ,Bn I~- CI , . . . ,C/  : D1,...,Dk. 
Note that the formalism also allows us to represent constraints, that is, program 
rules without heads. 
If S is an arbitrary set of bisequents, we will denote by It-s the least biconsequence 
relation containing all bisequents from S. Clearly, a bisequent will belong to IF-s if 
and only if it is provable from S using the rules of a biconsequence r lation. Similar- 
ly, if Sp is a set of bisequents corresponding to program clauses of a program P, then 
we will denote by IF-p the least biconsequence r lation containing Se. This biconse- 
quence relation can be considered as a logical theory corresponding to a logic pro- 
gram. Note also that any bimodel of IF-e can then be seen as a partial (Herbrand) 
model of P. 
Using the correspondence b tween bisequents and program rules, we will extend 
in what follows the logic programming terminology to biconsequence r lations. 
Thus, a biconsequence r lation will be called finite, if it is generated by a finite set 
of bisequents, normal, if generated by a set of "normal" bisequents of the form 
a:  b I~-A:, quasi-normal if it is generated by normal bisequents and constraints 
a : b IF, and disjunctive if generated by bisequents of the form a : b IF- c:. In addition, 
a bimodel (u, v) ofa biconsequence r lation will be called consistent ifu C_ v, complete 
if v c_ u and classical (total) if u = v. 
2.3. Introducing connectives 
To begin with, note that our formalism, unlike the majority of other formalisms 
for many-valued reasoning, does not depend, as such, on a particular choice of four- 
valued connectives. Moreover, any such connective is expressible in it via introduc- 
tion and elimination rules as in ordinary sequent calculi, the only distinction being 
that we have a pair of introduction rules and a pair of elimination rules correspond- 
ing to two premise sets and two conclusion sets, respectively (see [7,8] for details). In 
this study, however, we are not interested in a four-valued reasoning in its generality. 
Rather, we will be primarily interested in what information such a reasoning can give 
us about ordinary, classical truth and falsity, that is about t and f. In accordance with 
this, our first restriction will amount o the requirement that a four-valued reasoning 
must agree with a classical one in cases when the context does not involve inconsis- 
tent or incomplete information. This can be secured by restricting our connectives to 
those that are classical in the sense that they give classical values when their argu- 
ments receive classical values t or f. 
2.4. Classical connectives 
It turns out that in the class of all classical four-valued functions we can choose 
four natural connectives that are sufficient for expressing all such functions (this is 
shown in [8]). 
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The first is a well-known disjunction connective 
v bAVB iff v bA  or ~ 'bB  
157 
V-qAVB iff vq  A and v~B 
Next, there are two unary connectives that can be seen as natural 'extensions' of  a 
classical negation to the four-valued setting 
v b~A ill" ~'dA 
~,:q ~A iff ~' b A 
v }= ~A iff v~A 
iff v AM 
Note thatthese are the only connectives that coincide with a classical negation on 
the classical truth-values and satisfy the Double Negation rule. The difference be- 
tween the two is that the first one 'switches' the context between truth and falsity, 
while the second one retains the context: ~ A is true (false) iffA is false (resp., true), 
while ~A is true (false) iffA is not true (resp., not false). Accordingly, we will call 
and ~ a switching negation and a local negation, respectively. Note also that each of 
them can be used together with the disjunction to define a natural con~unction con- 
nective: 
AAB=~(~AV~B) ,  
or, equivalently, 
Finally, the following unary connective L can be seen as a kind of  a modal oper- 
ator. 2 It determines a (rudimentary) modal logic definable in the four-valued setting. 
v pLA  iff v ~A 
v :qLA  iff v>A 
It can be shown that all these connectives can be characterized using suitable in- 
troduction and elimination rules, given below. Just as in the classical case, the rules 
are easily discernible from the above definitions given the intended interpretation of  
the premises and conclusions of a bisequent. 
Rules for disjunction: 
a.A : b loc :  d a ,B :  bIF-c: d a: b J~-c.A,B:  d 
a: bl[-c, AVB:  d 
a: b ,A ,B  IF- c : d 
a: b, AVBI~-c :  d 
a. AVB:  b l f - c :  d 
a: blk-c:  d,A a: blk-c:  d ,B 
a: bl~-c: d .AVB 
2 Ginsberg [22] considered L as representing the belief operator of autoepistemic logic. 
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Rules for ~: 
a,A: brkc:  d a: A ,b lkc :  d 
a :~A,b lkc :  d a,..~A: b lkc :  d 
a: b lkc ,A :  d a: b lkc :A ,d  
a: b lkc :~A,d  a: blkc,. .~A: d 
Rules for ~: 
a,A: b lbc :  d a :A ,b lkc :  d 
a: bFb~A.c: d a: b lkc :~A,d  
a :b lPc ,A :d  a: b lkc :A ,d  
a,~A: b lkc :  d a: b .~A lbc :  d 
Rules for L: 
a,A: b lkc :  d a: b lPA,c :  d 
a, LA: b l?c :  d a: LA, b lkc :  d 
a: b lkA ,c :  d A,a: b lkc :  d 
a :  blk LA,c:  d a :  bll- c: LA,d 
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Just as in the case of classical ogic, the above rules can be used to show that any 
bisequent involving the above connectives i reducible, ultimately, to a set of bise- 
quents containing atomic propositions only. We will call such bisequents basic ones. 
More generally, for any given language containing only 'truth-functional' four-val- 
ued connectives, there is a one-to-one correspondence b tween biconsequence r la- 
tions and their restrictions to the basic bisequents. Note that the latter can be 
considered as biconsequence r lations on their own right, namely as biconsequence 
relations in the language without connectives. Such biconsequence r lations will be 
also called basic. Thus, any biconsequence r lation involving only four-valued con- 
nectives is equivalent to some basic biconsequence r lation. 
Having the above connectives at our disposal, we can transform bisequents into 
more familiar rules and formulas. 
For any set of propositions u, we will denote by ~ u the set {~ A [ A E u}. The 
notation ~u will have a similar meaning. In addition, for a finite set of propositions 
a, we will denote by V a (A a) the disjunction (respectively, conjunction) of all prop- 
ositions from a. In the proposition below we will use also a 'material implication' -+ 
definable in the usual way from ~ and v: 
A---+ B=~AVB 
Proposition 
Ill 
(2) 
2.1. Any bisequent a : b Ib c : d is equivalent to each of the following: 
a ,~b:  Ib c ,~ d: 
VcvV 
Aa,A b VcvV ,: 
Bisequents of the form (1) can be considered as ordinary rules with multiple con- 
sequents. Moreover, since the set of positive premises can be replaced by their con- 
junction and the set of positive conclusions - by their disjunction, we can transform 
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bisequents into usual "'Tarski-type" rules (2) using only the switching negation, con- 
junction and disjunction. Finally, using a local negation, we can 'move premises into 
conclusions, transforming thereby any bisequent into a provable formula (3). As for 
lhe classical sequent calculus, this transtBrmation establishes an equivalence between 
rule-based bisequent representation a d common formula-based (Hilbert-type) fk~r- 
lnalization. Moreover, it is easy to see that the disjunction and a local negation be- 
have in an entirely classical way in this situation. In other words, any bisequent, and 
hence any general program clause, is representable by a logical formula in the clas- 
sical language augmented with an additional negation ~. 
A war,ring m~te: The local negation ~ should not be identified with the classical, or 
explicit, negation used in some current extensions of logic programming (see [21~ 1]). 
The latter is usually weaker than the local negation and, in particular, does not sup- 
port the above transformation (3), or even a weaker property of contraposition. 
The above transformation of bisequents into logical formulas shows, in partic- 
ular, that if our representation of program clauses by bisequents i justified, then 
the connectives involved in program clauses can indeed be considered as logical 
com~ecHt,es of our four-valued logic. To be more exact, v and A can be seen, res- 
pectively, as four-valued isjunction and conjunction, ~ corresponds in this sense 
to material implication ~,  while not can be identified with the switching negation 
~. In this way. logic program clauses can, after all. be considered as logical 
I'ormulas. 
Remark. According to the view advocated in this work, a common understanding of
not as "negation by failure' (or 'negation by default') does not reflect he meaning of 
the connective, but rather a particular (nonmonotonic) mechanism of obtaining 
negative assumptions, a mechanism that we will describe in subsequent sections. In 
other words, on our view the logical (declarative) meaning of not is given by its four- 
valued interpretation, while the 'negation by default' principle says, roughly, that if a 
certain procedure of proving A fails, then we should assume not A "by default' (or 
"by failure', speaking in a more procedural fashion). 
3. Biconsequence relations circumscribed 
In this section we will give a description of the basic nonmonotonic construction 
providing a mechanism for 'jumping to conclusions' in the context of biconsequence 
relations. The basic idea behind the construction is the well-known minimi-alion 
pri~cit)le according to which truth and falsity of a proposition should be determined 
oll the basis of min#llal models satisfying a given body of knowledge or beliefs. This 
principle of nonmonotonic reasoning has already a long history that begins with Mc- 
Carthy's Circumscription. Reiter's Closed World Assumption and Minker's Gener- 
alized CWA. 
A modification of the minimization principle appropriate to our "bicomponent" 
context was suggested, in fact, by Teodor Przymusinski in [31] and subsequent papers 
(see also [36]), though our description will be somewhat different from that given there. 
It amounts to a relativization of the principle with respect to negative information. As 
we will see in the second part of this study [9], the resulting construction actually serves 
as a common onmonotonic component of all the major semantics for logic programs. 
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The notion of a minimal model used by the minimization principle is based on the 
ordering of models by inclusion with respect o propositional atoms that hold in 
them. Consequently, the definition of circumscription below is given with respect 
to basic biconsequence r lations. Note, however, that this does not restrict he gen- 
erality of our approach, since, as we said earlier, any biconsequence r lation contain- 
ing four-valued connectives i equivalent to some basic biconsequence r lation. It 
should be remembered, though, that the inclusion with respect o atoms does not im- 
ply inclusion with respect o all formulas that hold in models. 
A bimodel (u, v) of a basic biconsequence r lation will be called posit ively minimal  
if there is no bimodel (ul, v) such that ul C u. Now a Positive Minimizat ion Principle 
says that only positively minimal models should matter in determining truth-values 
of propositions. 
According to the Representation Theorem (see above), any set of bimodels deter- 
mines a biconsequence r lation. In particular, a set of positively minimal bimodels of 
any biconsequence r lation IF- determines another biconsequence r lation that we will 
call a circumscription of IF-. 
Definition 3.1. If Mm is a set of all positively minimal bimodels of a biconsequence 
relation It-, then It-M,, will be called a circumscription of I~-. We will denote this 
biconsequence r lation by It -c. 
The following proposition (proved in [7]) provides a syntactic haracterization f 
circumscription. 
Proposition 3.1. I f  l~ -c is a cicumscription oJ'l~-, then a : b I~-~ c : d i f f :  b, b' I? c, c' : d, d', 
for  any b ~, c ~, d' such that : b ~ I~ c', /~ a : d .  
As can be seen, the circumscription of a biconsequence r lation is uniquely deter- 
mined by bisequents without positive premises that belong to it. Moreover, it is 
shown in [7] that I~ -C can even be characterized asthe greatest biconsequence r lation 
having the same bisequents of such form as EF-. 
Finally, note that if IF- is represented using the corresponding logical formulas, 
then IU can be described as a result of circumscribing IF- with respect o atomic prop- 
ositions that are not in the scope of ~ (see [31]). In other words, It -C can be seen as a 
result of a parameter ized circumscription that does not vary negative propositions. 
Circumscription is in general a nonmonotonic operation. In other words, IF- c_ I~-~ 
does not imply, in general, that IF -~' is included in IF-~. There is an important special 
case, however, when this feature holds. 
Definition 3.2. A biconsequence r lation rF-i will be called a negative extension of a 
biconsequence r lation I~0 if I~- 1 coincides with the least biconsequence r lation 
containing IF-0 and all bisequents of the form : b IF- : d belonging to I~-i. 
As can be shown, a negative xtension is obtained by restricting possible negative 
parts of bimodels of the source biconsequence r lation. Consequently, if : vllZj: v 
holds (that is, if v is an admissible negative part of the negative xtension), then 
any bimodel (u,v) of v Ikl will also be a bimodel of v IF-0 and vice versa. As a result, 
we immediately obtain (see [7]) the following proposition. 
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Proposition 3.2. ( f  I Fl is a negative xtension of IF0, then I~-~l is a negative xtension of  
IFI;. 
This fact will be extensively used on what follows. 
3.1. Circumscription and GPPE 
As we said, the circumscription of a biconsequence r lation is uniquely deter- 
mined by bisequents without positive premises that belong to it. We will show 
now that this feature of the circumscribed biconsequence r lation constitutes a log- 
ical basis of the partial deduction (or evaluation) principle for logic programs (see 
[10,11,17,34]). 
The Generalized Principle o f  Partial Evaluation (GPPE) from [10,1 1,17] can be 
easily formulated for biconsequence r lations in general and amounts to the follow- 
ing: 
If S is a set of bisequents, replace a bisequent A, a : b IF c : d by a set of 
bisequents a,a, : b, bi IF c, c, : d, di, for every bisequent ai : b, IF ci, A : di 
fi'om S containing A among its positive conclusions. 
As can be easily seen, GPPE can be used to eliminate bisequents containing pos- 
itive premises. For example, in the case when A does not occur in heads of bisequents 
from S at all, any bisequent containing A among its positive premises can be simply 
eliminated. 
GPPE has been shown to be valid for a number of semantics for logic programs. 
It will also turn to be valid for all semantics generated by our general construction. 
This is due to the following result showing that GPPE preserves generated circum- 
scribed biconsequence r lations (Appendix A). 
Theorem 3.1. [ f  S is a set o f  bisequents and S' is obtained./?om S by an application o/ 
GPPE, then IFii, = IF~,,. 
The semantic onstruction described later in this paper is based on a certain ex- 
tension of the circumscribed biconsequence r lation corresponding to a program. 
Consequently, programs generating the same circumscribed biconsequence r lation 
will be always assigned the same semantics. In fact, GPPE can be seen as a general 
syntactic principle characterizing this feature of semantics for logic programs, a clear 
sign that a semantic is constructed, in effect, 'on top' of the circumscribed program. 
In what follows, for any biconsequence r lation IF, we will denote by R( IF ) the set 
of all minimal basic bisequents of the form : b IF c : d that belong to IF. This set will 
be called a resMual of IF. As follows from the results stated above, the residual of a 
biconsequence r lation uniquely determines its circumscription. 
3.2. Finite case: Circumscription and generalized Clark completion 
In this section we will give a logical procedure for computing the circumscription 
of a biconsequence r lation in the finite case. 
For any propositional atom A, we will denote by R '4 ( IF ) the set of all bisequents 
from the residual R( iF ) such that A C c. Then a basic biconsequence r lation will be 
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called locally finite ifRA( rF- ) is finite for every A in the language. As can be shown, 
any finite biconsequence r lation is also locally finite, but not vice versa. 
For any bisequent si =: b, It- ci :di, from RA( I[- ), we will denote by A,., the follow- 
ing formula in the language {V, 7 ~}: 
(Asi) V (c , \{A}U ~b iU  ~di )  
Notice that s, is equivalent to IF- ~A~i ~ A:. 
Let FF- be locally finite, A a propositional atom and s~,. . . ,s ,  all the bisequents 
from RA( IF- ). Then we will denote by SA the following bisequent 
(SA) A,A,.~,...,A~,, : lk 
Finally, we will denote by K( Ik ) the union of R( I~- ) and all bisequents SA, where 
A ranges over atomic propositions of the language. It turns out that K( I~- ) fully de- 
scribes the circumscribed biconsequence r lation corresponding to Ik. The proof of 
the next theorem can be found at the end of the paper. 
Theorem 3.2. I f  Ik- is a locally finite biconsequence relation, then I?' coincides with 
II-K( Ik ). 
In what follows, K( IF- ) will be called a kernel of the circumscribed biconsequence 
relation. 
The above theorem suggests a general method of circumscribing a (locally) finite 
biconsequence r lation. To this end we must find first R( IF- ), that is, the set of all 
minimal bisequents of the form : b If- c : d that belong to Ik. This can be achieved 
by a partial deduction technique (see above) that eliminates positive premises in bise- 
quents. After that we should add all bisequents of the form SA. As follows from the 
theorem, the resulting set of bisequents will be sufficient for representing the circum- 
scribed biconsequence r lation. 
Remark. The above procedure is actually equivalent to the construction of 
generalized Clark's completion of  the residual program suggested in [12] for what is 
called there 'super logic programs'. The correspondence an be easily established 
once we notice that, for any A, the set of bisequents RA( I[- ) U {SA } is representable by
the following 'completion' formula in the language {v, 7, ~}: 
A ~ ~ A({A,.~,... ,A~,,}), 
where {s l , . . . ,  s,, } is a set of all bisequents from RA(lk- ). Consequently, the kernel of 
the circumscribed biconsequence r lation can also be represented by a set of all such 
formulas. 
As is easy to show, bisequents SA are reducible to basic bisequents of the 'con- 
straint' form a : b IF- : d. Consequently, only bisequents of the latter type need to 
be added to a biconsequence r lation in order to produce its circumscription. 3 
3 A suitable counterexample canbe produced (see [7]) showing that the finiteness restriction is essential 
for this result. 
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Corollary 3.1. lJ" If- & a locally finite biconsequence relation, then IF ~ is the least 
hiconsequence r lation containing R( Ib ) and all bisequents of  the form a : b Ib : d from 
!~-~. 
This result can be further strengthened for particular kinds of biconsequence r - 
lations. Thus, the circumscription of disjunctive biconsequence relations, that is, 
biconsequence r lations determined by bisequents without negative conclusions, is 
determined only by bisequents of the form a : IF : d and : b !~- c :. 
Proposition 3.3./f ib is a locally finite disjunctive biconsequence r lation, then I~ -~ is the 
least biconsequenee relation containing all bisequents of the Jorm a: lb :  d and 
: h Ik- c :/?ore Ik -~. 
The next result gives a necessary and sufficient condition for including sequents of 
the lbrma:  IF-: d into  IH in this case. 
Proposition 3.4. For a disjunctive biconsequence r lation tk-. a : IFC: d (f and only (f 
hr3d 7 k O or : b!P c :,Jor any b, c such that: blP c, Aa  :. 
If a biconsequence r lation is quasi-normal (that is, corresponds to a normal pro- 
gram with constraints), then it can be shown that its circumscription is already de- 
termined by adding bisequents of the form A : IF- : d. The following results give 
the conditions for including such bisequents into the circumscription. 
Corollary 3.2. (1) For a quasi-normal biconsequence r lation Ib, A : IF¢': d if and only if 
: blP o rbNdCO,  fo ranybsuch  that : b lPA :. 
(2) I f  IF is a normal biconsequence r lation, then A : IU: d if'and only (f : [l U A :. 
It can be shown that, for normal biconsequence r lations, a : IkJ: d holds only if 
A: IU: d, for some A from a. However, even for quasi-normal biconsequence r la- 
tions this is not so, as shows the following example 
:CIPA: 
:DibB: 
:C, DIP 
The corresponding circumscription contains A,B: Ik-, but neither A : IP  
B: IF. 
nor  
4. Coherence 
Belnap's interpretation of the truth-values will help us once more, this time in de- 
termining some further plausible constraints on biconsequence r lations. 
The main benefit of Belnap's interpretation of the four truth-values i that it al- 
lows us to use four-valued reasoning as a general framework for logical reasoning 
in presence of inconsistent or incomplete information. However, this generality 
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has a weak side in that it completely ignores the distinction between ordinary truth 
and falsity, on the one hand, and inconsistency and incompleteness, on the other. All 
the four truth-values have an equal status in the context of such a reasoning. Con- 
sequently, what seems to be missing is a mechanism that would allow us to infer 
'classical' information in the framework of biconsequence r lations. 
These considerations lead us to a natural and rather strong requirement saying 
that, though truth and falsity are largely independent, provable truth and refutability 
must coincide with provable classical truth and falsity. If this condition holds for a 
biconsequence r lation, the information we can tnJbr using it will be of a usual clas- 
sical kind. 
Biconsequence r lations atisfying the above requirement will be called coherent. 
Note, however, that the strength of the requirement can vary depending on what 
propositional formulas are susceptible to coherence. Speaking generally, the more 
expressive is the language, the more strong is the corresponding constraint imposed 
by the requirement. 
In what follows, by a language LP we will mean a subset of classical connectives 
and by S-propositions propositions constructed from atoms using connectives from 
5 °. Then a rule that holds for a biconsequence r lation will be called logical in a lan- 
guage 5F if it does not involve explicit occurrences of connectives, but is valid for 
substitutions of arbitrary S-propositions for propositional atoms. 
Definition 4.1. A biconsequence r lation will be called S-coherent if it satisfies the 
following two logical rules with respect o S :  
IF A : A : Ik 
(Positive Coherence) (Negative Coherence) 
: A Ik rk : A 
The Positive Coherence rule says that if a proposition A is provably true, then it 
cannot be false (and hence it is classically true in all bimodels). Similarly, Negative 
Coherence says that ifA cannot be true, it must be false (and hence is classically false 
in all bimodels). 
The influence of the underlying language 5¢ amounts to imposing language re- 
strictions on the applicability of the coherence rules. As we will see in the second part 
of the study, different semantics for logic programs can be obtained by varying these 
restrictions. 
As is shown in [8], the actual constraint imposed by a logical rule can be 'mea- 
sured' in terms of what restrictions it imposes on the associated basic biconsequence 
relation. A rule that holds for a biconsequence r lation will be called structural if it is 
a logical rule with respect o the empty language (3. In other words, a rule is struc- 
tural if it does not involve connectives, but is valid for all substitutions of other pro- 
positional atoms for atoms involved in the rule. Alternatively, such a rule can be seen 
as a logical rule for the associated basic consequence r lation. It turns out that log- 
ical rules considered in this paper can be always characterized in terms of some struc- 
tural rules implied by it. 
5. Nonmonotonic ompletion and semantics 
Finally we have all we need in order to describe a nonmonotonic entailment and 
semantics generated by a given biconsequence r lation. In fact, they arise from a 
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combination of the two reasoning principles described earlier, namely coherence and 
minimization. 
Definit ion 5.1. A nonmonotonic Y -complet ion  of a biconsequence r lation IF (denoted 
by < IF m) is the least ~V-coherent biconsequence r lation containing IF <. 
Clearly, " IF ~ is a biconsequence r lation obtained from L~ by first circumscribing 
it and then adding the coherence rules. As we will see in the second part of the study, 
this extension of the source biconsequence r lation embodies all the information that 
can be nonmonotonically inferred from the latter. 
'Historical' m~te: As a matter of fact, the above construction of the nonmonotonic 
completion and semantics have arisen as a certain modification of Teodor Przymu- 
sinski's earlier, nonmodal construction of stationary completion and semantics for 
disjunctive logic programs, suggested in [31]. Actually, the very formalism used by 
Przymusinski in that paper was very similar to that of a four-valued logic (we will 
discuss this in more details in [9]). The relevant modifications made to Przymusm- 
ski's construction could be summarized as IMlows: 
• The underlying language was allowed to vary in order to characterize alternative 
semantics for logic programs (in Przymusinski's construction such a variation was 
achieved through a change in non-monotonic principles used). 
• The fixed-point construction of the stationary completion was 'splitted" into two 
consecutive stages: circumscription and coherence. As a result, the fixed point 
characterization f the completion was replaced by coherence closure of the cir- 
cumscribed consequence relation. This idea of performing circumscription % 
one step" with subsequent closure with respect o coherence rules was 'borrowed', 
in fact, fiom [36]. 
Let us consider the extent to which the general construction of nonmonotonic 
completion above depends on the underlying language. Note first that circumscrip- 
tion, as it is described earlier in the paper, is language independent since it is defined 
on the level of basic bisequents. Coherence rules, however, depend crucially on what 
connectives are allowed. Consequently, the influence of the language ~ amounts to 
imposing language restrictions on the applicability of the coherence rules. We will 
see, however, that in each particular case of interest here are structural rules that 
are equivalent to given &°-coherence rules. As a result, the description of the corre- 
sponding nonmonotonic completion can be always given without the use of the log- 
ical connectives. It should be remembered, however, that the justification of the 
resulting construction lies ultimately in its logical formulation. 
In accordance with the above definition of a nonmonotonic completion, we can 
define a mmmonotonic  ~'-semantics of a biconsequence r lation as a pair of sets of 
J'-propositions that are, respectively, provable and refutable in the nonmonotonic 
W'-completion: 
Definit ion 5.2. A nonmonotonic 2<semantics of a biconsequence r lation IF. SEM { , 
is a pair (SEM ~ . SEM ) of sets of S-propositions uch that 
SEM ={AIqF~A:} ,  SEM ={AIA:<IFJ '}. 
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Due to 5¢'-coherence, all propositions that belong to SEM + will be both provably 
true and provably non-false in the nonmonotonic completion (that is classically 
true), while those from SEM - will be provably classically false. 
As we already said, for a general ogic program P, we denote by Ikp the least 
biconsequence r lation containing bisequents corresponding to all clauses from P. 
This biconsequence r lation can be seen as representing a logical theory correspond- 
ing to P. Now, for all semantics we will consider in the second part of this study [9], P 
and Ikp (viewed as a set of program rules) will have the same semantics. In accor- 
dance with this, we can safely use SEM p to denote SEM ~p. 
5.1. Ex&tence 
It should be clear that a biconsequence r lation, even if it is consistent, may have 
no consistent nonmonotonic completion. A simplest example is a biconsequence r - 
lation containing both IkA : and Ik: A, or both A : Ik and : A Ik, since in each of 
these cases the closure with respect o the coherence rules immediately produces 
an inconsistency. However, there is a general sufficient condition that turns out to 
be useful in establishing consistency of some nonmonotonic completions. 
Definition 5.3. A biconsequence r lation will be called S-regular if it satisfies the 
following logical rule for L-~-propositions 
: blk-: a 
a:  Ikb: 
The following proposition has been proved in [7]. 
Proposition 5.1. For any consistent biconsequence r lation Ik,/f Ik c is Lf-regular, then 
Ik has a consistent nonmonotonic 5~-completion. 
A biconsequence r lation will be called affirmative (cf. [32]) if it does not contain 
basic bisequents of the 'constraint' form a : b Ik : d (in other words, any bisequent 
has positive conclusions). Thus, normal and disjunctive biconsequence r lations 
are affirmative. The following proposition, also proved in [7], uses the fact that such 
biconsequence r lations are always {V, ~}-regular and, moreover, satisfy the condi- 
tion of Proposition 5.1 for this language. 
Proposition 5.2. An), affirmative biconsequence r lation has a cons&tent {V,~}- 
completion. 
As we will see in the second part of this study, {V, 9}- completions correspond to 
a version of stationary semantics as well as to a natural generalization of stable class 
semantics for logic programs. 
An important feature of nonmonotonic completions of regular biconsequence r - 
lations is that provably true and provably false propositions coincide, respectively, 
with propositions that are provably nonfalse and provably nontrue. In other words, 
for provable propositions, truth coincides with nonfalsity, and hence the nonmono- 
tonic completion gives us, in a sense, classically coherent information. 
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Proposition 5.3. Let {V, ~} C S and ~ I~ be a nonmonotonic Y'-completion q /a  
reguhtr biconsequence r lation I~-. Then, jor any £#-proposition A, 
"IF-: A iff A:'IF- 
" I~- A : i f f  : A "I~- 
6. Preliminary conclusions 
In this first part of our study we have described a general logical formalism suitable 
for representing and reasoning about logic programs with negation by failure of a 
most general kind. We have presented also a uniform construction of the semantics 
for such programs. In the second part [9] we will show that this construction is suffi- 
ciently expressive to capture major existing semantics of logic programs of this kind. 
What we see as the main advantage of our formalism is that it has allowed us to 
provide a clear separation oJlogical and nonmonotonic aspects q/reasoning about logic 
progranTs. As a first benefit of this separation, we have "discerned' a logic appropriate 
for general ogic programs, and thereby restored the connection between Logic and 
Logic Programming. Moreover, as will be seen from the results in the second part [9], 
common kinds of reasoning about logic programs and their semantics are reducible, 
in effect, to different kinds of logical reasoning in a certain well-defined (nonmono- 
tonic) extension of the source theory. In a sense, in this paper we have described only 
one general semantics for logic programs, more specific semantics being merely par- 
tial cases obtained by restricting the underlying language. 
Note. It should be clear that the above claim is tailored to our representation of
logic programs and does not exclude a possibility that some alternative formalism 
could achieve, in principle, the same goal of representing different semantics by pre- 
serving the underlying monotonic basis but varying, for example, its nonmonotonic 
part (see our discussion of Przymusinski's approach above). Cf. also [29] for still an- 
other account of the distinction between well-founded and stable semantics. 
Finally, as we mentioned in the Introduction, there is a fairly general way of "lilt- 
ing" our formalism of biconsequence r lations to a formalism that subsumes classical 
inference. In this way we will obtain such 'standard" nonmonotonic formalisms as 
default logic and various modal nonmonotonic logics. These issues are studied in 
[5]. The very possibility of such a uniform extension shows that reasoning embodied 
in logic programs involving negation as failure can be seen as a special case of non- 
monotonic reasoning in general. 
Appendix A. Proofs of the main results 
We give here proofs for the two new theorems tated in the paper. 
+4.1. Proo/' q/' Theorem 3.1. 
Let us assume that S' is obtained from S by replacing a bisequent 
A, a0 : b0 IF- Co : d0 by a set of bisequents 
ao,a, : bo,bi [k- co, ci : do,d,, (*) 
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for every bisequent ai : bi Ik q,A  : di from S containing A among its positive conclu- 
sions. We need only to show that Iks and Iks, have the same bisequents of the form 
:b lkc :  d. 
To begin with, note that any bisequent from (*) can be obtained from S by an ap- 
plication of the Cut rule. Consequently, If-s, c IFs. Now if : b IF s,C : d, then there is 
a bimodel (u, v) of  Iks, such that b c_ g, c c_ ~ and d C v. I f  (u, v) is also a bimodel of 
t~-s, then we are done, since this would imply : b IF s c : d. Otherwise, (u, v) should 
not be closed with respect o the bisequent A, a0 : b0 IF Co : do (since this is the only 
sequent that does not belong to Iks,). This means that {A} Ua0 _C u, bo C_ g, co C_ 
and do C_ v. Since (u, v) is closed with respect o the bisequents from (*), we have also 
that, for any bisequent ai : b~ Ik ci,A : di f rom S, if a, _C u and b~ C_ v, then either 
q N u ¢ ~ or di n ~ ¢ 13. But then it can be easily seen that (u \ {A}, v) is a bimodel 
of  ?s ,  since it is closed with respect to all bisequents from S. Consequently : b IF s 
c : d, and hence any bisequent :b IF c : d belongs to Iks iff it belongs to Iks,. [] 
A.2. P roo f  o f  Theorem 3.2. 
Notice first that bimodels of Ik~( ~ ) are precisely pairs (u, v) of  sets of  proposit ions 
that are closed with respect to bisequents from K( Ik ). We will show that such 
bimodels coincide with positively minimal bimodels of IF. To begin with, it is easy 
to show that (u, v) is closed with respect o R( Ik ) if and only if:  ~)f ~ : v. This con- 
dition means that there exists a bimodel (u0, v) of Ik such that u0 _C u. In addition, 
(u, v) is closed with respect o all SA iff, for any A, either A ~ u, or there is a bisequent 
s - - :b lk  c:  d from RA(IF) such that A~ is not true in (u,v) .  The latter condition 
amounts toc \{A}C_~,dCvandbC~.Consequent ly ,  i fAEu ,  then :v lk~,A  : v 
by Monotonicity.  Therefore, there can be no bimodels (u', v) of  IF- such that u' is a 
proper subset of  u. Combining this with the earlier condition, we obtain that (u, v) 
is a positively minimal bimodel of Ik. 
Assume now that there is a positively minimal bimodel (u, v) of Ik that is not 
closed with respect to some bisequent SA. Then A E u and consequently 
:v Ik ~,A : v, since (u, v) is positively minimal. Therefore there must exist a bise- 
quent s - :b  Ik c : d in RA(IF ) such that b _c v,c \ {A} c_ ~ and d c v. But then it 
is easy to check that the formula As is not true in (u, v), contrary to the assumption 
that (u,v) is not closed with respect to SA. Consequently, all positively minimal 
bimodels of  Ik are closed with respect to all the bisequents determining IkK(~), and 
hence are bimodels of  the latter. Thus, bimodels of  rkx( ~ i are exactly positively min- 
imal bimodels of IF, and therefore IF-K( IF ) coincides with IF'. [] 
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